See that if the individual chance (q) finds out the advantage regarding package will get 0. Up coming only the influenced debtors tend to repay early, if for example the ex article rate of interest stays large. But in the case off a lowering interest most of the debtors often pay-off very early. Those people for just who the bonus in the deal stays b have a tendency to repay very early or take upwards a separate borrowing at the a diminished interest rate. The remainder, to own which the private exposure have know might pay-off early. In their eyes this new obtain regarding the bargain could well be 0.
They reinvests the fresh new paid down mortgage at the same interest rate while the this new lending speed
In the model a risk premium exists only for the first credit and not for the second credit. If the debtor takes up the second credit at the low interest rate ( \(_<2l>)\) the interest rate cannot-by assumption-decline any more in future. The bank cannot impose a risk premium on the second credit, because the bank has no damage if the second credit is also prematurely repaid. In the real world it would however recover its handling costs, which are in the model assumed to be 0. This assumption avoids an infinite regress for the calculation of the risk premium without affecting the main point of the analysis. Otherwise, the calculation for the risk premium of the second contract would require the possibility of a third contract and so forth.
Now assume that the first credit is taken up not in the high interest period but in a low interest period \(_<1>=_<1,l>\) . In that case the future, post contractual interest rate can by assumption not further decline. It is either unchanged or higher. Therefore, in this case the only risk of the bank is that the personal risk q realizes. But a damage cannot occur, because an early repayment allows the bank to either invest the money at the same rate or at an even higher rate. We can therefore exclude this case from further consideration. The expected gain of the debtor from the contract is then
If the risk premium is roofed explicitly, we have into the asked get off a card offer, that was finished throughout a leading desire months
It constellation about design, where early fees regarding credit reasons zero damages and consequently zero interest rate mark up isnt further thought inside the following study.
If the legal remedy for early repayment is expectation damages the damage from early repayment is the difference between the contractual and the post-contractual interest rate \(_<1>-_<2>\) . The bank can invest the repaid money at an interest rate of \(_<2>\) . It can, for instance, buy mortgage bonds on the secondary age payment results if and only if \(_<1>>_<2>\) . Otherwise the differential method of damage calculation results in a damage award of zero. The compensation payment is therefore
Let us now assume that after the conclusion of the contract the market interest rate falls, but the benefit from the contract remains at b. We get an outcome which is different in comparison with the result under a right of premature repayment. The debtor wants to end the contract and take out a new mortgage at the low interest rate. With expectation payday loans Manitou Springs damages as remedy for breach of contract her gain would be \((b-_<2>)-\left( _<1>-_<2>\right)=b-_<1>\) . The term in the first bracket is the consumer’s gain from the new mortgage contract and the term in the second bracket denotes the amount of damages to be paid. The early repayment motivated by the lower interest rate does not result in a gain that is higher than the gain from performance of the contract as originally concluded. Therefore, no early repayment results for taking up a new credit if interest rates decrease after contract formation (Table 2).